

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 04903 01 OF 06 111951Z

63

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 USNATO 4903

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TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJ: NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO USE
NUCLEAR WEAPONS

REF: (A) NPG (STAFF GROUP)WP(74)7 (2ND REVISION) DATED

JULY 25, 1974

B. USNATO 4719

C. STATE 193225

SUMMARY: MISSION FORWARDS BELOW THE TEXT OF THE MAIN BOYD OF
THE THIRD REVISION OF THE NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING NATO
INTENTIONS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (CNI) PREPARED BY US/UK/FRG/IS
SUB-GROUP ON BEHALF OF THE NPG STAFF GROUP. THE THIRD REVISION
REFLECTS STAFF GROUP DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 9 (REPORTED
SEPTTEL) OF UK COMMENTS ON THE PREVIOUS DRAFT OF STUDY (REF A).
THE DISCUSSION OF PROCEDURES IN THE THIRD REVISION IS CONTAINED
IN AN ANNEX, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS THE SAME AS PARAS 32-46
OF REF A. THE STAFF GROUP HOPES TO COMPLETE DISCUSSION OF
THE CNI STUDY AT SEPTEMBER 16 MEETING. ACTION REQUESTED:
WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON THIRD REVISION OF CNI STUDY IN TIME FOR
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04903 01 OF 06 111951Z

SEPTEMBER 16 STAFF GROUP MEETING. END SUMMARY. BEGIN TEXT:

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

THIS STUDY EXPLORES THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO AN ENEMY, TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC. IT IDENTIFIES AND EXAMINES THE PRINCIPAL FACTORS THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN NATO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING ITS INTENTION TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS DEFENCE. THE STUDY ALSO DISCUSSES PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF HANDLING THE QUESTION IN NATO. THE STUDY FOCUSES ON THE COMMUNICATION THAT NATO MIGHT CHOOSE TO MAKE IN SUPPORT OF A DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SELECTIVELY.

II. BACKGROUND

2. PORTIONS OF TWO REPORTS PREPARED BY THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NPG MINISTERS AT THEIR MEETING IN ANKARA IN MAY, 1973 COMMENTED ON THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS. THESE WERE A REPORT (1) CONTAINING SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF WINTEX 75, AND A REPORT (2) COMMENTING ON AN ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON DEMONSTRATIVE USE (3) PREPARED BY SHAPE. IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THESE REPORTS, THE NPG MINISTERS INVITED (4) THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO INITIATE A STUDY ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO ANY ENEMY, TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC, AND ON RELATED PROCEDURAL MATTERS.

(1) NPG/D(73)3, 17TH APRIL, 1973, PARAGRAPH 17
(2) NPG/D(73)4, 17TH APRIL, 1973, PARAGRAPHS 15, 16
(3) NPG/STUDY(71)4, 11TH MARCH, 1971, ENCLOSURE 2
(4) NPG/D(73)7, 21ST MAY, 1973, PARAGRAPH 16
NPG (STAFF GROUP)WP(74)7
(3RD REVISION)

3. AS A RELATED MATTER, IT MIGHT BE NOTED THAT THE NPG HAS GIVEN ATTENTION TO THE SUBJECT OF WARSAW PACT PERCEPTIONS OF NATO'S INTENTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ITS EXAMINATION OF WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04903 01 OF 06 111951Z

THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1). IN THIS CONTEXT, THE NPG PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY OF MINIMISING THE CHANCES OF WARSAW PACT MISINTERPRETATION OF NATO'S INTENTIONS (2).

4. THIS STUDY WAS PREPARED BY THE NPG STAFF GROUP, CONSISTING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF TWELVE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN NPG ACTIVITIES. STAFF OFFICERS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF, SHAPE AND SACLANT ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THE DRAFTING OF THE STUDY. PARTICIPATION BY NATIONAL OR INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES DOES NOT IMPLY THAT THE STUDY NECESSARILY REFLECTS THE VIEWS OF THE COUNTRIES OR STAFFS CONCERNED.

III. POLICY FRAMEWORK

5. STRATEGIC CONCEPT. THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE THREAT OF FURTHER ESCALATION IS, ACCORDING THE THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, "TO INDUCE THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS ATTACK AND WITHDRAW"(3). THE AGREED NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE SET OUT IN MC 14/3, PARAGRAPH 17, SEEKS TO DETER AGGRESSION BY CONVINCING A POTENTIAL ATTACKER THAT THE RISKS INVOLVED

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- (1) NPG/STUDY/45, 8TH MARCH 1974, VOLUME I, PARAGRAPH 4;
VOLUME II, PARAGRAPHS 38-41
- (2) NPG/D(74)6, 16TH MAY, 1974, ANNEX PARAGRAPHS 7, 8, 11
- (3) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 21
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ARE OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO THE OBJECTIVE SOUGHT, AND THAT NATO, IN DEFENDING ITSELF IF AGGRESSION DOES OCCUR, IS PREPARED TO ESCALATE THE CONFLICT, IF NECESSARY, TO A POINT THAT WOULD JEOPARDISE EVEN THE NATIONAL EXISTENCE OF THE AGGRESSOR. IN THE EVENT IT IS ATTACKED, NATO WOULD DEFEND ITSELF THROUGH DETERMINED BUT CONTROLLED USE OF WHATEVER MIX OF CONVENTIONAL TACTICAL NUCLEAR OR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES IS NEEDED TO BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED CHANGE OF MIND ON THE PART OF THE AGGRESSOR. THERE IS A BASIC THEME OF "NEGOTIATION WHILE FIGHTING" INHERENT IN THIS APPROACH, JUST AS THERE IS AN IMPLIED REJECTION OF A STRATEGY THAT CALLS FOR THE COMPLETE DESTRUCTION

SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04903 01 OF 06 111951Z

OF THE ENEMY SOCIETY AND ITS MILITARY FORCES AS THE PREFERRED MEANS TO BRING THE AGGRESSION TO A HALT. ALTHOUGH THE ACTIONS OF NATO'S DEFENSIVE FORCES CAN THEMSELVES CONVEY AN IMPLICIT MESSAGE TO AN ENEMY CONCERNING NATO'S OBJECTIVE, RELIANCE ON THIS MEANS ALONG MIGHT BE INADEQUATE. NATO STRATEGY MIGHT BE BETTER SERVED IF THERE IS A PARALLEL EFFORT TO COMMUNICATE ITS OBJECTIVE IN OTHER WAYS AS WELL. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WHEN THE SELECTIVE TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS INVOLVED, BECAUSE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENEMY MISINTERPRETATION OF NATO'S INTENTION COULD BE SVERE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04903 02 OF 06 112021Z

63
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 6 USNATO 4903

6. THE NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE FORESEES THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEED FOR NATO TO ESCALATE DURING THE COURSE OF A CONFLICT IN ORDER TO DEFEND ITSELF EFFECTIVELY AGAINST INTENSIFIED ENEMY ATTACKS AND TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE IN THE ENEMY'S MIND (1). WITH RESPECT TO INITIAL TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING BOTH THE OVERALL SITUATION AND THE PROCESS OF ESCALATION UNDER CONTROL(2). A SIMILAR EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON CONTROL OF ESCALATION IF IT SHOULD BECOME NECESSARY FOR NATO TO

(1) MC 14/3, PARAGRAPH 17B

(2) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 23-27

RESORT TO FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE(1). CNI ACTIONS HAVE AS A PRIMARY PURPOSE THE REINFORCEMENT OF NATO'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE ESCALATION PROCESS AND IDEALLY TO BRING THE CONFLICT TO THE END.

7. IN THE EVENT OF NATO BEING DRIVEN TO MAKE A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE(2), EITHER BECAUSE ALL OTHER MILITARY AND
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04903 02 OF 06 112021Z

DIPLOMATIC ACTION HAD FAILED TO HALT THE ENEMY'S AGGRESSION, OR IN REPLY TO A SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK, A CNI MESSAGE WOULD SERVE LITTLE PURPOSE. IN THE FORMER CASE IT WOULD INVITE A PREEMPTIVE SOVIET STRIKE AND IN THE LATTER THERE WOULD BE NO TIME FOR THE ALLIANCE TO CONSULT ABOUT SENDING ONE. ON THE OTHER HAND IF NATO'S RESPONSE TO AGGRESSION INVOLVED A DECISION TO UNDERTAKE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THEN A CNI MESSAGE COULD BE VALUABLE TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE ENEMY WHAT NATO HAD DONE AND WHY, AND/OR WHAT NATO MIGHT DO IF HE PERSISTED IN HIS ATTACK.

CURRENT POLICY ON COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION

8. THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF POLICY GUIDANCE ON THE SUBJECT OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTION CONCERNING TACTICAL USE OF

NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE FOUND IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY NATO(3). THE RELEVANT PARTS ARE QUOTED FOR EASE OF REFERENCE:

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- (1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 94-98
 - (2) MC 14/3, PARAGRAPH 17 C
 - (3) DPC/D(69)58(REVISED), 10TH DECEMBER, 1970. HEREAFTER REFERRED TO AS PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES.
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"COMMUNICATION OF NATO'S INTENTION

38. IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 21 ABOVE, AND TO PREVENT UNCONTROLLED ESCALATION, TWO REQUIREMENTS MUST BE MET:

(A) THE ENEMY MUST BE CONVINCED OF NATO'S READINESS TO PROCEED WITH NUCLEAR ESCALATION.

(B) THE RISKS OF THE ENEMY MISINTERPRETING THE THE DELIBERATELY LIMITED NATURE OF NATO'S INITIAL USE MUST BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM.

39. IN ORDER THAT NATO'S INTENTION IN INITIATING TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAN BE MADE CLEAR TO THE NEMY, IT WILL GENERALLY BE NECESSARY TO CONVEY SOME MESSAGE OF EXPLANATION
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04903 02 OF 06 112021Z

AND WARNING TO HIM, ADDITIONAL TO THE MESSAGE THAT WOULD BE IMPLICIT IN THE USE ITSELF. THE FORM, CONTENT AND TIMING OF THE MESSAGE WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED IN THE LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES. IT SHOULD REACH THE ENEMY IN SUFFICIENT TIME BEFORE THE INITIAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR HIM TO APPRECIATE NATO'S PURPOSE, AND SHOULD THREATEN FURTHER ESCALATION IF HE FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE WARNING. NATO MUST, HOWEVER, BE AWARE OF THE LOSS OF SURPRISE WHICH WOULD RESULT, AND OF THE DANGER THAT THE ENEMY MIGHT EXPLOIT THE EXPLANATION AND SARNING RECEIVED BY REACTING IN A MANNER JEOPARDISING NATO'S DEFENCE POSTURE. IF SUCH AN EVENT SHOULD OCCUR, NATO SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ESCALATE FURTHER.

40. ALL POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS AVAILABLE TO THE NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD BE EXPLLITED TO COMMUNICATE THE STATEMENT TO THE ENEMY AND TO EXPLAIN NATO'S ACTIONS TO THE REST OF THE WORLD, AND TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY GOVERNMENTS IN ORDER TO LEARN THEIR REACTION WITHOUT DELAY AND TO INFLUENCE THAT REACTION TO THE UTMOST. IN THIS CONNECTION, PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE MUST BE ATTACHED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND THE EXISITING "HOT LINES". BETWEEN THE CAPITALS ARE OBVIOUSLY RELEVANT. IT MUST, HOWEVER, BT KEPT IN MIND THAT, UNDER CERTAIN CURCUMSTANCES, PUBLIC COMMUNICATION OF NATO ACTIONS

OR INTENTIONS COULD HAVE AN ADVERSE IMPACT UPON THE EFFECT OF THE WARNING.

41. ALL ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NATO'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OF THE REACTIONS OF THE AGGRESSOR, AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED FOR SUITABLE MEASURES ADDRESSED TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC AND TO THE FORCES.

42. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO EXPLOITING TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE THE EFFECTS ON ENEMY COHESION AND ON WORLD OPINION GENERALLY."

9. IN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON MEASURES BY NATO IN THE EVENT THAT INITIAL USE DOES NOT ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT, THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES STATE THAT SUCH FOLLOW-ON USE "SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED, IF POSSIBLE, BY A MESSAGE OF EXPLANATION
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04903 02 OF 06 112021Z

AND WARNING AS IN THE CASE OF INITIAL USE"(1).

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 95.

10. STARTING WITH THE EXISTING POLICY GUIDELINES CITED IN PARAGRAPH 8 AND 9 ABOVE AND HAVING IN MIND THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT SUMMARISED IN PARAGRAPH 5 TO 7 ABOVE, THIS PAPER DISCUSSES BELOW:

(A) WHAT FACTORS WILL INFLUENCE NATO'S DECISION TO COMMUNICATE ITS INTENTIONS TO THE ENEMY;

(B) WHAT FORM SUCH A COMMUNICATION MIGHT TAKE, IT IS RECOGNIZED IN THIS CONTEXT, THAT A CNI ACTION WOULD ENCOMPASS ALL THE MEASURES NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATE NATO'S INTENTION IN REFERENCE TO A SPECIFIC USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

(C) BY WHAT CHANNELS SUCH A COMMUNICATION MIGHT BE CARRIED.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04903 03 OF 06 112054Z

63
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 6 USNATO 4903

IN CONSIDERING THESE ASPECTS, THE STUDY HAS NOT ADDRESSED IN ANY DETAIL THE SUBJECT OF ONGOING PEACETIME COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE WARSAW PACT, AND HAS EXAMINED THE QUESTION OF COMMUNICATION WITH NATO PUBLICS AND THIRD COUNTRIES ONLY IN SO FAR AS IT MAY BE RELATED TO CNI ACTIONS TOWARD AN ENEMY. THE STUDY WAS FOCUSED ON CNI QUESTIONS THAT WOULD CONFRONT POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC USE DECISION. ALTHOUGH THE EXISTING POLICY GUIDANCE NOTES THAT "IT WILL GENERALLY BE NECESSARY" TO SEND A CNI MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY, THE STUDY HAS INTERPRETED THIS TO MEAN THAT NATO IS NOT OBLIGATED TO TAKE A CNI ACTION IN EVERY CASE.

1. CNI DECISION TO BE TAKEN. THERE ARE TWO GENERAL KINDS OF CNI QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT CONFRONT NATO IF, IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES, A DECISION IS REACHED TO RESORT TO THE SELECTIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. FIRST, NATO WOULD HAVE TO CONSIDER WHETHER ANY STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO EXPLAIN ITS INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC USE. IF THE ANSWER TO THIS QUERY IS YES, NATO WOULD THEN HAVE TO EXAMINE A COMPLEX OF SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS DEALING WITH THEN DETAILS OF CARRYING OUT THE CNI ACTIN.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04903 03 OF 06 112054Z

12. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CNI DECISIONS AND THE USE DECISION.

AS NOTED EARLIER, CURRENT POLICY GUIDANCE DOES NOT OBLIGATE NATO TO TAKE A CNI ACTION ON EVERY OCCASION OF SELECTIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE, A DECISION TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS NOT IN ITSELF A DECISION TO TAKE A CNI ACTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, A DECISION TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A PREREQUISITE FOR REACHING A DECISION TO TAKE A CNI ACTION; IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THERE IS NO "USE" TO EXPLAIN. FURTHERMORE, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A CNI ACTION MUST BE CAREFULLY COORDINATED WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE USE DECISION IT IS DESIGNED TO EXPLAIN. BECAUSE OF THIS DEPENDENT RELATIONSHIP, IT IS USEFUL TO VIEW THE PROCESS OF REACHING DECISIONS ON CNI QUESTIONS AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE LARGER PROCESS OF CONSULTING ON PROPOSALS OR REQUESTS FOR SELECTIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

IV. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT POLICY
INTRODUCTION

13. THIS PART OF THE STUDY IDENTIFIES AND DISCUSSES THE PRINCIPAL SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS THAT POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN NATO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN DEALING WITH THE TWO GENERAL KINDS OF CNI QUESTIONS, NAMELY, WHETHER TO TAKE A CNI ACTION AND, IF SO, HOW TO CARRY IT OUT. ALTHOUGH THESE FACTORS ARE ALL INTERRELATED AND INSEPARABLE IN REALITY, FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES IT IS NECESSARY TO TREAT THEM SEPARATELY. CNI ACTIONS DIRECTED TO THE ENEMY ARE CONSIDERED IN THE FIRST SECTION; THOSE DIRECTED TO OTHER AUDIENCES, INsofar AS THEY ARE RELATED TO CNI ACTIONS TOWARD THE ENEMY ARE TREATED IN THE SECOND. AN ARTIFICIAL DISTINCTION IS DRAWN BETWEEN THE DISCUSSION OF THESE SUBSTANTIVE FACTORS AND THE EXAMINATION OF SOME PROCEDURAL ASPECTS WHICH ARE AT ANNEX TO THIS STUDY.

DECIDING WHETHER TO TAKE CNI ACTION TOWARDS THE ENEMY

14. IMPACT OF THE WAR SITUATION. THE WAY IN WHICH A POSSIBLE CONFLICT EVOLVES MIGHT AFFECT CNI DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY IF NATO IS FORCED TO RESORT TO FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04903 03 OF 06 112054Z

NATO COULD BE PLACED IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIRST, AN ACT THAT THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES HAVE DESCRIBED AS A BASIC QUALITATIVE CHANGE IN WARFARE AND A DISTINCT AND HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT STEP IN ESCALATION(1). IF THIS SHOULD OCCUR, IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO ASSESS THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION THAT CNI ACTIONS COULD MAKE TOWARD EXPLAINING BOTH THE NATURE OF, AND REASONS FOR, NATO'S INITIAL USE. SIMILARLY, CNI ACTIONS COULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN NATO FOLLOW-ON USE OR IN SITUATIONS WHERE NATO RESPONDS TO WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR USE.

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 23

15. IF NATO IS FORCED TO RESORT TO THE SELECTIVE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS A DECISION WILL HAVE TO BE MADE WHETHER A PARALLEL CNI ACTION SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN. THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES STATE THAT IT WILL GENERALLY BE NECESSARY TO CONVEY SOME MESSAGE OF EXPLANATION AND WARNING TO THE ENEMY IN ADDITION TO THE MESSAGE WHICH WOULD BE IMPLICIT IN THE USE ITSELF(1). HOWEVER, IT IS RECOGNISED THAT A CNI ACTION HAS POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES, BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY. THESE ARE DISCUSSED BELOW.

17. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. NATO'S RESOLVE TO RESIST AGGRESSION, AND ITS POLICY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE ARE CONTINUALLY MADE EVIDENT TO THE OTHER SIDE. POLICY STATEMENTS, THE

STRUCTURE OF FORCES AND THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENTS, AND EXERCISE BEHAVIOUR, ALL SIGNAL NATO'S INTENTIONS TO THE WARSAW PACT. IN THE TIME OF TENSION THESE "SIGNALS" BECOME EVEN MORE IMPORTANT, AND A CNI MESSAGE WOULD REST IN PART WHETHER IT WAS CONSISTENT WITH PAST "SIGNALS" AND WHETHER THE WARSAW PACT HAD IN THE PAST BEEN ABLE TO INTERPRET CORRECTLY NATO'S ACTIONS AND STATEMENTS.

17. THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES MENTIONED TWO REQUIREMENTS ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF INITIAL USE (AND, BY IMPLICATION, OF FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE AS WELL) THAT HAVE GREAT POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE THAT THE ENEMY MUST BE CONVINCED OF NATO'S READINESS TO PROCEED WITH NUCLEAR ESCALATION, AND THAT THE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04903 03 OF 06 112054Z

RISKS OF THE ENEMY MISINTERPRETING THE DELIBERATELY

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPHS 39, 40, 41

LIMITED NATURE OF NATO'S INITIAL USE MUST BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM(1) A CNI ACTION SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TOWARD MEETING BOTH OF THESE REQUIREMENTS. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT MIGHT BE RECALLED THAT THE CNI MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY, FORESEEN IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR EITHER INITIAL OR FOLLOW-ON TACTICAL USE, WOULD CONTAIN ELEMENTS OF EXPLANATION AND OF WARNING. THESE ELEMENTS MIGHT BE EXAMINED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TWO REQUIREMENTS MENTIONED ABOVE.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04903 04 OF 06 112138Z

63

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 6 USNATO 4903

18. WITH RESPECT TO NATO'S READINESS TO PROCEED WITH NUCLEAR ESCALATION, A CNI ACTION WOULD PROVIDE NATO WITH THE MEANS TO EXPLAIN CLEARLY TO AN ENEMY THAT NATO REGARDED ITS USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A NECESSARY ESCALATORY STEP THAT NATO WAS WILLING TO TAKE IN ITS OWN DEFENCE. THIS EXPLANATION COULD REINFORCE THE EVIDENCE OF NATO'S RESOLVE TO DEFEND ITSELF THAT IS INHERENT IN THE USE PER SE. BY THE SAME TOKEN, THE WARNING ELEMENT OF A CNI ACTION WOULD PERMIT NATO TO REMIND THE ENEMY, IN A MORE EXPLICIT WAY THAN DOES THE USE ITSELF, THAT THERE IS A CONTINUING RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION. THIS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO INTRA-WAR DETERRENCE BY CONTINUING TO CONFRONT THE ENEMY WITH A CREDIBLE BUT INCALCULABLE RISK THAT NATO MIGHT RESORT TO FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON USE. IN THIS REGARD, IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT THE "NEGOTIATION WHILE FIGHTING" APPROACH EMBODIED IN CURRENT NATO STRATEGY RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY REACTION TO A CNI MESSAGE COULD, IN EFFECT, REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF MAKING THE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT NATO SEEKS. IN SUCH A CASE, POLITICAL AUTHORITIES MAY WISH TO GIVE URGENT CONSIDERATION TO MODIFYING OR EVEN NEGATING THE USE DECISION THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, WITH DUE REGARD FOR THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY MAY
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04903 04 OF 06 112138Z

SEEK TO PREVENT THE CONTEMPLATED USE THROUGH DECEPTION.

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 38

19. ON THE OTHER HAND, HOWEVER, IN THE EVENT OF NATO'S CONSTRAINED USE BEING MISINTERPRETED BY THE ENEMY AS A LACK OF RESOLVE, A RELATED CNI ACTION MIGHT BE SEEN BY HIM AS A BLUFF. WITH RESPECT TO MINIMISING THE RISK OF THE ENEMY MISINTERPRETING THE DELIBERATELY LIMITED NATURE OF NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPON USE, A CNI ACTION MIGHT ALSO BE HELPFUL. MENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY COULD MISINTERPRET NATO'S CONSTRAINED USE AS A LACK OF RESOLVE. HOWEVER, A MORE SERIOUS RISK FROM THE NATO POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY WOULD MISTAKENLY VIEW NATO'S LIMITED USE AS MERELY A STEP IN A UNCONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLABLE ESCALATION PROCESS, TO WHICH A WIDE-SCALE NUCLEAR RESPONSE TO PRE-EMPT NATO'S REMAINING MILITARY CAPABILITY MIGHT SEEM TO HIM TO BE THE ONLY SUITABLE REACTION. BOTH THE EXPLANATION ELEMENT AND THE WARNING ELEMENT IN A CNI ACTION COULD OBVIOUSLY PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN SEEKING TO CONVINCE THE ENEMY THAT THE PARTICULAR NATO NUCLEAR USE IN QUESTION IS THE RESULT OF A DELIBERATE DECISION AND IS CONTROLLED, SELECTIVE, AND LIMITED IN SCOPE AND DURATION.

20. IT MIGHT BE THOUGHT THAT A CNI MESSAGE WHICH INFORMED THE ENEMY CLEARLY WHAT NATO FUTURE ACTION WOULD BE WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE NEED TO KEEP THE ENEMY UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE

NATURE AND SCALE OF NATO'S REACTION TO AN ATTACK, WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DETERRENCE. HOWEVER, ONCE THERE HAS BEEN AN ATTACK ON NATO, NATO WILL BE FACED WITH THE NEED TO RESTORE DETERRENCE AND TO PERSUADE THE ENEMY TO CEASE ITS AGGRESSION. THIS NATO WOULD SEEK TO DO BY A MIXTURE OF MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC ACTION, AND ONE REINFORCING THE OTHER. IN THIS PROCESS OF "NEGOTIATING WHILE FIGHTING" NATO WOULD WISH THE ENEMY TO BE IN NO DOUBT AT ALL ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES TO HIM OF PERSISTING WITH AND/OR ESCALATING HIS AGGRESSION AND CNI ACTION MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO THIS END.

21. IN ADDITION TO DECLARING NATO'S INTENTION TO RESIST AGGRESSION BUT AT THE SAME TIME ITS WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04903 04 OF 06 112138Z

ESCALATION, A CNI ACTION MIGHT PROVIDE A VEHICLE FOR ACCOMPLISHING OTHER OBJECTIVES, SUCH AS:

(A) TO SHOW AN INTEREST IN TERMINATING THE CONFLICT SHORT OF MUTUAL DESTRUCTION;

(B) TO INDICATE POSSIBLE DE-ESCALATORY STEPS THAT COULD BE TAKEN BY EITHER SIDE, OR BOTH;

(C) TO DISPLAY AN AWARENESS OF THE ENEMY SITUATION AND THE OPTIONS OPEN TO HIM;

(D) BY INFORMING IN ADVANCE OF USE, TO INDICATE A HOPE OR A BELIEF THAT BOTH SIDES ARE CAPABLE OF EXERCISING RESTRAINT;

(E) TO IMPLICITLY EXPRESS AN EXPECTATION OF RECIPROCAL BEHAVIOUR;

(F) TO HELP AVOID PANIC BEHAVIOUR ON THE ENEMY SIDE BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE REDUCTION OF STRESS.

IN THIS SENSE, A CNI ACTION COULD BE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE PROCESS OF "NEGOTIATING WHILE FIGHTING."

22. MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES WARN THAT A CNI ACTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF SURPRISE AND COULD RAISE THE DANGER THAT THE ENEMY MIGHT EXPLOIT THE EXPLANATION AND WARNING RECEIVED BY REACTING IN A MANNER JEOPARDISING NATO'S DEFENCE POSTURE(1). THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE LOSS OF SURPRISE MIGHT BE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WOULD SEEM TO DEPEND MAINLY ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME BETWEEN THE ENEMY'S RECEIPT OF THE CNI MESSAGE AND THE DETONATION OF A WEAPON. OBVIOUSLY, IF NO CNI ACTION IS TAKEN OR IF IT IS NOT TAKEN UNTIL THE USE OCCURS, THERE CAN BE NO LOSS OF SURPRISE ATTRIBUTABLE TO A CNI ACTION PER SE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF NO CNI ACTION IS TAKEN OR IF IT IS DELAYED UNTIL AFTER THE

DETONATION, ITS VALUE IN MINIMISING THE RISKS OF THE ENEMY
MISINTERPRETING THE DELIBERATELY LIMITED NATURE OF NATO'S
USE WOULD SEEM TO BE SERIOUSLY DEGRADED. AS NOTED EARLIER, ONE
POSSIBLE ENEMY MISINTERPRETATION COULD BE THE MISTAKEN VIEW
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04903 04 OF 06 112138Z

THAT NATO'S LIMITED USE WAS MERELY A STEP IN UNCONTROLLED
AND UNCONTROLLABLE ESCALATION PROCESS. IF THIS LED TO A WIDE-
SCALE NUCLEAR RESPONSE BY THE ENEMY, THE CONSEQUENCES
FROM A NATO MILITARY POINT OF VIEW COULD BE MUCH MORE SEVERE
THAN THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF LOSS OF SURPRISE.

23. A SIMILAR SITUATION MAY APPLY WITH RESEPECT TO THE DANGER
THAT THE ENEMY MIGHT EXPLOIT THE EXPLANATION AND SARNING
RECEIVED BY REACTING IN A MANNER JEOPARDISING NATO'S DEFENCE
POSTURE. WHILE THIS RIKS CANNOT BE DENIED, A FAILURE TO SEND
A CNI MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE KIND OF
MININTERPRETATION MENTIONED ABOVE COULD ALSO RESULT IN THE NEMY
RACTING IN A MANNER JEOPARDISING NATO'S DEFENCE POSTURE, OR
EVEN OVERWHELMING IT.

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 39

24. ALTHOUGH A CNI ACTION MAY BE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE
IN POLITICAL TERMS, IT MAY NOT BE OF THE SAME SIGNIFICANCE IN
A MILITARY CONTEXT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT A
CNI ACTION WOULD NOT BE THE FIRST OR THE ONLY INDICATION TO AN
ENEMY THAT ANTO MAY BE ABOUT TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS. INDEED, IN SUPORT OF ITS OBJECTIVE TO DETER AGGRESSION,
NATO HAS REPEATEDLY STATED THAT, IF IT IS ATTACKED, IT HAS
BOTH THE DETERMINATION AND THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER AGGRESSION
BY WHATEVER MEANS ARE APPROPRIATE. TO DO THIS, NATO MAINTAINS A
FULL SPECTRUM OF CONVENTIONAL, TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. THUS, THE ENEMY HAS ALREADY BEEN PUT ON
NOTICE THAT NATO HAS THE INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
ITS DEFENCE, IF REQUIRED. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, IT CAN BE
EXPECTED THAT NATO WOULD TAKE STEPS TO CONFIRM AND REINFORCE
THIS BASIC MESSAGE IF TENSION BUILDS UP AND AGGRESSION OCCURS.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04903 05 OF 06 112206Z

63
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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CINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 6 USNATO 4903

IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT THE ENEMY WOULD BE ABLE TO MAKE SOME REASONABLY ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS OF NATO'S MILITARY SITUATION IN THE LIGHT OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT, INCLUDING ESTIMATES OF THE PRESSURES THAT MIGHT BE PUSHING NATO TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPON USE. FINALLY, THE POSSIBILITY THAT SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF NATO'S MILITARY OPERATIONS MAY PROVIDE SOME INDICATIONS TO THE ENEMY OF IMPENDING USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE RULED OUT. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY CONSIDERATION TO BE WEIGHED IN REACHING A DECISION WHETHER TO TAKE A CNI ACTION MAY BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THAT ACTION MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TOWARD MINIMISING THE RISK OF ENEMY OVER-REACTION, BALANCED AGAINST WHICH MAY BE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS OR POSSIBLE LOSS OF TACTICAL SURPRISE.

CNI ACTIONS TO OWN PUBLIC AND OTHER COUNTRIES

25. AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF REACHING A DECISION WHETHER TO TAKE A CNI ACTION, NATO POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD WISH TO CONSIDER THE POSSIBLE NEED TO COMMUNICATE NATO'S INTENTION TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC, PARTICULARLY THE POPULATIONS
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04903 05 OF 06 112206Z

OF NATO COUNTRIES(1). FOR POLITICAL REASONS, IT MIGHT BE QUITE IMPORTANT FOR OTHER COUNTRIES TO RECEIVE SPECIFIC ADVICE FROM NATO CONCERNING THE NATURE OF, AND REASONS FOR, ITS SELECTIVE TACTICAL USE, BOTH IN TERMS OF MINIMISING THE POSSIBILITY THAT THESE COUNTRIES WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE AN EXAGGERATED AND DISTORTED IMPRESSION OF THE RISK AND THE NATO ACTION POSED TO THEM, AND IN TERMS OF THE ROLE THESE COUNTRIES MIGHT PLAY IN INFLUENCING THE ENEMY TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISIONS NATO SEEKS. THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF COUNTRIES WHO DO NOT HAVE THEIR OWN MEANS FOR LEARNING THE DELIBERATELY LIMITED NATURE OF THE NATO USE. SIMILAR CONSIDERATIONS MIGHT APPLY WITH REGARD TO THE PUBLIC. WITH REGARD TO THE POPULATIONS OF NATO COUNTRIES IN PARTICULAR, A CNI ACTION MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO DOMESTIC COHESION AND PUBLIC MORALE BY INDICATING THE CONCERN OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS FOR THEIR PEOPLE AND BY PROVIDING EVIDENCE THAT UNCONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLABLE ESCALATION HAS

(1) IT IS ASSUMED THAT NATO MILITARY AND CIVIL DEFENCE AUTHORITIES WOULD GIVE SAFETY WARNINGS, AS FEASIBLE, TO FRIENDLY TROOPS AND POPULATIONS IN THE VICINITY OF THE TARGETS OF THE INTENDED NATO NUCLEAR WEAPON USE WHETHER OR NOT A CNI ACTION WAS TAKEN.

NOT TAKEN CHARGE. ON THE OTHER HAND, A CNI ACTION ADDRESSED TO OTHER COUNTRIES OR THE PUBLIC MIGHT, IF INITIATED TOO FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE TIME OF THE ACTUAL USE, HAVE THE POLITICAL DRAWBACK OF ALLOWING AN OPPORTUNITY FOR PROTESTS AND COUNTERVAILING PRESSURES TO BUILD UP. FINALLY, THERE IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DANGER THAT A CNI ACTION OF THIS SORT COULD, EITHER SPONTANEOUSLY OR UNDER INTENTIONAL STIMULATION, GENERATE UNNECESSARY PANIC. IN THIS REGARD, IT MIGHT BE NOTED THAT THE USE ITSELF, PARTICULARLY IF ITS LIMITED NATURE IS NOT EXPLAINED BY NATO, RAISES SIMILAR RISK OF UNNECESSARY PANIC.

26. THE MILITARY FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED BEFORE DECIDING ON A CNI MESSAGE TO THIRD PARTIES, WOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE DISCUSSED IN PARAGRAPHS 22-24 ABOVE.

V. IMPLEMENTING A CNI ACTION

SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04903 05 OF 06 112206Z

GENERAL

27. IT IS EVIDENT FROM THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO IMPLEMENT A CNI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH A PARTICULAR SELECTIVE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE BASED ON THE OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF A MIX OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS THAT ARE LIKELY TO BE CONFLICTING AND DIFFICULT TO WEIGH. ALTHOUGH THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES CLEARLY INDICATE THAT A CNI ACTION IS LIKELY TO BE TO NATO'S ADVANTAGE, THE ACTUAL DECISIONS CAN ONLY BE REACHED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION THAT EXISTS AT THE TIME THAT A USE DECISION IS BEING MADE.

28. IF A DECISION IS REACHED TO TAKE A CNI ACTION, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MAKE CERTAIN OTHER DECISIONS, BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL, IN ORDER TO CARRY OUT THE CNI ACTION EFFECTIVELY. THE SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS, WHICH ARE COVERED IN THIS PART OF THE STUDY, CONCERN THE CHOICE OF ADDRESSES, MESSAGE CONTENT, TIMING CONSIDERATIONS AND ASSESSING THE RESULTS. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS ARE COVERED AT ANNEX.

29. THE ANNEX TO THIS PAPER DISCUSSES THE POSSIBLE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION THROUGH WHICH NATO'S CNI MESSAGES MIGHT BE CARRIED. SOME OF THESE CHANNELS WOULD BE VULNERABLE EVEN IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A CONFLICT. RELIABLE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT WOULD, HOWEVER,

BE OF CRUCIAL IMPORTANCE TO THE PROCESS OF "NEGOTIATING WHILE FIGHTING" AND TO COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS. NATO SHOULD THEREFORE CONTINUE TO ENSURE RELIABLE CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE WARSAW PACT AND SEEK TO IMPROVE THEM WHERE POSSIBLE.

30. SELECTION OF ADDRESSES. AS MENTIONED EARLIER, CNI MESSAGES CAN BE ADDRESSED TO THE ENEMY, TO OTHER COUNTRIES, OR TO THE PUBLIC, OR TO A COMBINATION OF THESE ADDRESSES. TO SOME EXTENT, A SINGLE MESSAGE CAN SERVE INDIRECTLY TO REACH MORE THAN ONE ADDRESSES: FOR EXAMPLE, A STATEMENT FOR THE GENERAL PUBLIC IS LIKELY TO COME TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ENEMY AND THE GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES. THE SAME MIGHT BE TRUE OF A MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IF THEY MADE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE COULD BE MERIT IN DEALING WITH THE
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04903 05 OF 06 112206Z

VARIOUS ADDRESSES INDIVIDUALLY. FOR EXAMPLE, SUCH AN APPROACH HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING THE MESSAGE CONTENT TO BE TAILORED TO SOME EXTENT TO FIT THE PARTICULAR AUDIENCE. IT ALSO PERMITS SOME FLEXIBILITY IN TIMING, AS WELL AS IN THE VARIOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS THAT ARE DISCUSSED LATER. FINALLY, IT FACILITATES SECRET COMMUNICATION WITH THE ENEMY IF THAT SHOULD BE DESIRABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, TO REDUCE FACE-SAVING COMPLICATIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE IF A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE OR IF OTHER COUNTRIES BECOME INVOLVED.

31. GENERAL FEATURES OF A CNI MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY.

ALTHOUGH THE VOLUME, THE DURATION, THE ORIGINATOR(S) AND THE CONTENT OF THE COMMUNICATION FLOW WHICH WOULD PRECEDE A CNI ACTION CANNOT BE ESTIMATED IN ADVANCE, IT SEEMS TO BE ADVISABLE THAT THE CNI MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY BE CLEARLY LINKED WITH EARLIER TRAFFIC SO THAT THE CONTINUITY OF ACTION ON NATO'S SIDE BECOMES OBVIOUS TO HIM. A DEMONSTRATION THAT THE RUKS LEVELS TAKEN BY THE ALLIANCE ARE CAREFULLY CALCULATED AND THAT THE ENEMY'S OPTIONS ARE INTELLIGENTLY PERCEIVED BY NATO IS LIKEWISE ADVISABLE. RUTHERMORE, THE ANALYSES OF FORMER CRISES SUGGEST THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO DRIVE THE ENEMY INTO DIRECTION OF ONLY ONE ALTERNATIVE, BUT INSTEAD TO INDICATE VARIOUS OUTLETS THAT ENABLE THE ENEMY TO ACT IN A WAY WHICH LEADS TO A DE-ESCALATION IN WHICH HE CAN PARTICIPATE AND EARN CREDIT. FINALLY, IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IMPERATIVE THAT THE CNI MESSAGE INCLUDE SOME COMMENT WITH REGARD TO NATO'S OWN POLITICAL AND MILITARY EXPECTATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES.

SECRET

PAGE 01 NATO 04903 06 OF 06 112326Z

63
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-11 L-03 ACDA-19

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 6 USNATO 4903

32. GENERAL FEATURES OF A CNI MESSAGE TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC. MOST, IF NOT ALL, OF THE FEATURES CONTAINED IN A CNI MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY SHOULD BE REFLECTED IN ANY COMMUNICATION OF NATO'S INTENTION TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC, WHETHER THIS IS DONE IN A SINGLE COMBINED MESSAGE OR IN SEPARATE MESSAGES. THE SPECIFIC CONTENT MAY ALSO NEED TO BE ADJUSTED IF THE MESSAGE IS BEING USED AS AN INDIRECT MEANS TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE ENEMY. GENERALLY SPEAKING, A CNI MESSAGE TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC SHOULD EMPHASISE NATO'S RESOLVE AS WELL AS ITS OVERALL OBJECTIVES, MOTIVATIONS AND COMMITMENT TO CONTROLLED USE OF FORCE IN ITS OWN DEFENCE. THE MESSAGE SHOULD ALSO REFLECT THE ENEMY RESPONSIBILITY IN CREATING THE CONFLICT SITUATION THAT LED TO THE NATO DECISION. FINALLY, NATO'S EXPECTATIONS WITH REGARD TO THE ROLE OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE PARTICULAR ASSURANCE TO ITS OWN PEOPLE THAT ALL MEASURES ARE BEING TAKEN TO AVOID UNWANTED COLLATERAL DAMAGE WOULD BE DISPENSABLE INGREDIENTS OF THIS KIND OF MESSAGE.

33. TIMING CONSIDERATIONS. THE TIMING ASPECTS OF IMPLEMENTING A CNI ACTION CAN BE VIEWED FROM BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 04903 06 OF 06 112326Z

PERSPECTIVES. IN THE CONTEXT OF SUBSTANTIVE CONSIDERATIONS, MENTION HAS ALREADY BEEN MADE OF THE STATEMENT IN THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES THAT A CNI MESSAGE SHOULD REACH THE ENEMY IN SUFFICIENT TIME BEFORE THE ACTUAL USE FOR HIM TO APPRECIATE NATO'S PURPOSE(1). CONSIDERATION SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY LEADERS MAY NEED AN OPPORTUNITY TO ENSURE CONTROL OF ESCALATION ON THEIR SIDE. TIMING MAY ALSO BE IMPORTANT IN SENDING CNI MESSAGES TO OTHER COUNTRIES IF, FOR EXAMPLE, NATO WISHES TO GIVE THEM THE CHANCE TO INFORM THEIR OWN PEOPLE OR TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH THE ENEMY ON NATO'S BEHALF. ON THE OTHER HAND,

THE EARLIER DISCUSSION POINTED OUT THAT TAKING A CNI ACTION IN ADVANCE OF ACTUAL USE COULD POSE CERTAIN POLITICAL AND MILITARY RISKS.

34. TIMING IS ALSO A VERY IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ALLINACE CONSULTATION IN TIME OF HOSTILITIES ON THE COMPLEX SET OF CNI QUESTIONS. THIS ASPECT OF THEI NUCLEAR CONSULTATION PROCESS SHOULD, IF TIME AND CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT, BE CARRIED OUT IN A WAY THAT PROVIDES FOR EFFECTIVE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON ALL FACETS OF THE SUBJECT AS WELL AS FOR THE THE ESSENTIAL COORDINATION OF ARRANGEMENT FOR ANY IMPLEMENTING STEPS. CARE MUST BE TAKEN THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE CONSULTATION (1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 39

PROCESS DOES NOT UNDULY DEALY OR COMPLICATE CONSULTATION ACTIVITIES LEADING UP TO THE RELEASE DECISION ITSELF, OR INTERFERE WITH THE EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF AN AFFIRMATIVE RELEASE DECISION IS REACHED.

3. LEARNING THE REACTIONS. THE PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES NOTE(1) THE NEED TO KEEP IN CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY GOVERNMENTS TO LEARN WITHOUT DELAY THEIR REACTION TO EFFORTS HAT NATO MAY MAKE TO COMMUNICAE ITS INTENTIONS. THIS COULD BE OF CONSIDERABLE VALUE TO NATO IN ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF ITS COMMUNICATION EFFORTS AND IN DEVISING WAYS TO MAKE THE EFFORTS MORE EFFECTIVE. THERE WOULD ALSO BE DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO'S ECRUITY AND ITS DEFENCE FORCES IF THEY ENEMY REACTION WERE ADVERSE OR EVEN UNCERTAIN. SOME INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY REACTION MAY BECOME AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DIALOGUE THAT WILL PRESUMABLY BE GOING TO BETWEEN NATO AND THE ENEMY
SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 04903 06 OF 06 112326Z

AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF "NEGOTIATION WHILE FIGHTING" BUT NATO WOULD NEED TO USE ITS OWN INTELLIGENCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES AS WELL. IN ADDITION, OBSERVATION AND REPORTS FORM INDEPENDENT SOURCES, SUCH AS GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND THE NEWS MEDIA, SHOULD BE EXPLOITED. IN THE EFFORT TO LEARN ENEMY REACTIONS, IT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT FOR NATO TO WATCH ENEMY ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS TO LISTEN TO HIS PRONOUNCEMENTS, SINCE HIS WORDS NEED NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT HIS ACTIONS. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED IN THIS CONTEXT THAT THE

(1) PROVISIONAL POLITICAL GUIDELINES, PARAGRAPH 40

REACTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUAL WARSAW PACT MEMBERS MAY NOT BE IDENTICAL. KNOWLEDGE OF DIVERGENCIES ON THE ENEMY SIDE MIGHT BE USEFULLY EXPLOTIED BY NATO, NO ONLY TO ENHANCE THE FFECTIVE-NESS OF ITS COMMUNICATION EFFORTS BUT ALSO TO STRENGTHEN OTHER ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF NATO'S STRATEGY.

36. FOR REASONS AREADY MENTIONED ABOVE, IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY FOR NATO TO SEEK TO LEARN THE REACTIONS OF OTHER

COUNTRIES AND THE PUBLIC TO NATO'S COMMUNICATION OF INTENTION, PARTLY BECAUSE THESE REACTIONS ARE IMPORTANT IN THEIR OWN RIGHT BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY WILL BE OBSERVED BY THE ENEMY, TOO.

VI. SUMMARY

37. SINCE THE ADOPTION OF THE STRATEGY OF FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE IN 1967, NATO HAS REPEATEDLY STATED IN PUBLIC AND IN OFFICIAL FORUMS THAT, IF ATTACKED, IT WOULD DEFEND ITSELF AT WHATEVER SCALE MIGHT BE REQUIRED, INCLUDING THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF NECESSARY. NATO HAS ALSO WIDELY PUBLICISED THE OBJECTIVE OF ITS DEFENSIVE EFFORT, NAMELY, TO INDUCE AN AGGRESSOR TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO CEASE HIS AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW BY CONVINCING HIM THROUGH NATO'S DETERMINED BUT DILIBERATELY CONTROLLED USE OF FORCE THAT THE RISKS OF CONTINUED AGGRESSION FAR OUTWEIGH ANY GAINS THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN FORESEEN. THE MIX OF CONVENTIONAL, TACTICAL NUCLEAR AND STRATEGIC FORCES MAINTAINED IN PEACETIME NATO GIVES CLEAR EVIDENCE OF ITS CAPABILITY TO DO THIS; NATO'S POLITICAL CONSULTATION ACTIVITY AND MILITARY PLANNING IN PEACETIME TESTIFY TO THE WILLINGNESS AND DETERMINATION OF THE ALLIANCE TO
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 04903 06 OF 06 112326Z

FOLLOW THROUGH WITH ITS DECLARED STRATEGY. IN PARTICULAR, THE PUBLICISED ACTIVITY OF THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP ATTESTS TO THE SERIOUS EFFORT UNDERTAKEN WITHIN NATO TO DEVELOP THE CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY UNDERPINNING TO SUSTAIN A READINESS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ITS DEFENCE. THEREFORE, IT IS CLEAR THAT NATO HAS ALREADY GIVEN STRONG INDICATIONS TO A POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR OF ITS INTENTION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF THE NEED SHOULD ARISE.

38. IF AGGRESSION OCCURS AND NATO CONCLUDES AT SOME POINT THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO RESORT TO THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NATO WOULD ALSO HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER TO COMMUNICATE TO THE ENEMY, TO OTHER COUNTRIES AND TO THE PUBLIC ITS INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC USE IN MIND. IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY FOR NATO TO DO SO IN ORDER TO REINFORCE THE EVIDENCE OF NATO'S RESOLVE AND AT THE SAME TIME TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF ENEMY OVER-REACTION AS RESULT OF FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE CONTROLLED, LIMITED CHARACTER OF NATO'S NUCLEAR EFFORT. ON OTHER HAND, THERE COULD BE RISKS AND DISADVANTAGES AS WELL. THE DISCUSSION IN PARTS IV AND V OF THIS STUDY MENTIONS SOME OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT IN MAKING A DECISION ON WHETHER TO SEND SPECIFIC MESSAGES OF EXPLANATION AND WARNING IN CONNECTION WITH PARTICULAR OCCASIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPON USE.

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